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417 
SEX OFFENDERS ARE DIFFERENT: EXTENDING 
GRAHAM TO CATEGORICALLY PROTECT  
THE LESS CULPABLE 
INTRODUCTION 
Phillip Alpert was seventeen years old when his then-sixteen-year-old 
girlfriend sent him nude photos.
1
 A year later at age eighteen, during a 
breakup, Alpert made an error in judgment.
2
 He went online and 
forwarded the pictures to his girlfriend‘s email contact list.3 He was 
arrested and charged with seventy-two offenses, including lewd and 
lascivious battery, possesssion of child pornography, and distribution of 
child pornography.
4
 He pled guilty and is now a registered sex offender.
5
 
Alpert cannot live near schools or playgrounds and was expelled from 
school.
6
 Barring a change in current law, he will be removed from the sex 
offender registry when he turns forty-three.
7
 
John Doe, on the other hand, has a long history of sexual crimes, 
typically involving children.
8
 He has multiple convictions for molestation, 
attempted molestation, and exhibitionism.
9
 Doe was banned from entering 
the Lafayette, Louisiana, public parks after a citizen complained that he 
was cruising parks and watching children.
10
 Doe readily admitted that he 
went to the park to watch children, that he was having sexual urges toward 
them, and that he thought about exposing himself to them.
11
 Doe‘s 
psychiatrist testified that Doe had no control over his sexual thoughts and 
that he would always have inappropriate urges for sexual contact with 
 
 
 1. Vicki Mabrey & David Perozzi, ―Sexting”: Should Child Pornography Laws Apply?, ABC 
NEWS/NIGHTLINE, ABCNEWS.COM (Apr. 1, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/phillip-alpert-
sexting-teen-child-porn/story?id=10252790&page=1. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id.  
 6. Id. 
 7. See FLA. STAT. § 943.0435 (2011). At the time of this Note, Alpert still appears on the sex 
offender registry. Florida Department of Law Enforcement Sexual Offender/Predator Flyer for Philip 
Michael Alpert, FLORIDA DEP‘T OF LAW ENF., http://offender.fdle.state.fl.us/offender/flyer.do?person 
Id=60516 (last visited Dec. 27, 2011). Several states—for example, Nebraska, Utah, and Vermont—
have already reformed their child pornography laws to prevent teens who ―sext‖ from being charged. 
See Mabrey & Perozzi, supra note 1. Florida is considering a similar reform. Id.  
 8. The facts concerning this particular sex offender come from Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 
F.3d 757, 758 (7th Cir. 2004). John Doe is a pseudonym used by Doe in filing his suit. 
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. at 759. 
 11. Id. at 759–60. 
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children.
12
 She opined that the park ban helped him to control his urges, 
but conceded that it was no guarantee he would not reoffend.
13
 
These two stories represent two extremes of sex offenders.
14
 While 
Alpert clearly committed a crime and deserved to be punished, he has no 
other history of sexual violence or pedophilia.
15
 Alpert was a minor 
himself when he received the pictures, and had just turned eighteen when 
he sent them out.
16
 He was motivated by anger after his breakup, not a 
desire for sex or violence. Doe is a pedophile, and cannot control his 
thoughts toward children.
17
 He readily admits his urges, and his 
psychiatrist testified that he should be kept away from children.
18
 Despite 
these differences, Alpert and Doe are both registered sex offenders.
19
 And, 
as registered sex offenders, Alpert and Doe would be subject to the same 
residency restrictions in some states.
20
 
First enacted in 1995, residency restrictions have rapidly spread in the 
last fifteen years.
21
 The restrictions prohibit designated sex offenders from 
residing within certain distances, often 1000 or 2000 feet, of areas where 
children congregate.
22
 The specific details vary from law to law.
23
 Some 
states, such as Florida, seek to regulate only those whose crimes include 
 
 
 12. Id. at 760–61. 
 13. Id. at 761. 
 14. There are, of course, more extreme sexual offenders. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 
U.S. 407 (2008). Doe provides an excellent example of an offender who is very likely to recidivate and 
has clearly defined sexual urges toward children that he cannot control.  
 15. See Sarah Geraghty, Challenging the Banishment of Registered Sex Offenders from the State 
of Georgia: A Practitioner‟s Perspective, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 513, 517–18 (2007) 
(contrasting the pedophile rapist image that most associate with sex offenders with many she met in 
practice, including a high school senior that had sex with his girlfriend when she was a high school 
freshman, a man in a wheelchair suffering from Parkinson‘s disease, and many with mental 
retardation.)  
 16. Alpert is not alone in making this mistake. ―Sexting‖ is on the rise, and the law has yet to 
adapt. See Riva Richmond, Sexting May Place Teens at Legal Risk, N.Y. TIMES GADGETWISE (Mar. 
26, 2009), http://gadgetwise.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/26/sexting-may-place-teens-at-legal-risk/. 
 17. Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 759 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 18. Id. at 761. 
 19. While the court‘s use of a pseudonym prevents a reader from looking Doe up on the register, 
the crimes he committed in Indiana would require him to register as a sex offender. See IND. CODE 
§ 11-8-8-4.5(3) (2007); IND. CODE § 11-8-8-5 (2006). On Alpert, see supra note 7. 
 20. In Florida where Alpert lives, for example, both would be prohibited from residing within 
1,000 feet of a school or a place where children congregate. FLA. STAT. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (Supp. 
2011).  
 21. David A. Singleton, Sex Offender Residency Statutes and the Culture of Fear: The Case for 
More Meaningful Rational Basis Review of Fear-Driven Public Safety Laws, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 
600, 607 (2006) (outlining early residency restrictions).  
 22. Asmara Tekle-Johnson, In the Zone: Sex Offenders and the Ten-Percent Solutions, 94 IOWA 
L. REV. 607, 617–19 (2009) (describing state and local sex offender residency restrictions). 
 23. See id. at 607–09, 617–19 (comparing moderate schemes to harsher regimes and even 
stronger local laws). 
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children.
24
 Others only restrict those who have committed more serious 
sexual crimes or are otherwise classified as dangerous.
25
 Louisiana, for 
example, makes it unlawful for a sexually violent predator to be within 
1000 feet of defined areas that children are likely to frequent.
26
 Other state 
laws, however, go further and apply broadly to all registered sex 
offenders—regardless of the underlying crimes.27 Residency restrictions 
may be imposed by either states or municipalities,
28
 with many 
municipalities imposing more stringent restrictions than the states.
29
 The 
most commonly stated reasons for imposing these restrictions are to 
prevent children from abduction and to prevent pedophiles from 
―grooming‖ children.30  
Though popular, residency restrictions have been consistently criticized 
in academic literature.
31
 Many commentators observe that they are 
ineffective or unnecessary.
32
 Others highlight the extreme loss of liberty 
these restrictions impose.
33
 Still others observe that they often regulate 
 
 
 24. FLA STAT. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (Supp. 2011) (imposing residency restrictions where the 
victim of the predicate crime is under the age of eighteen).  
 25. See IND. CODE § 11-13-3-4(g)(2)(A) (2007) (imposing restrictions on violent sex offenders). 
 26. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1 (2004) (defining unlawful presence of a sexually violent 
predator). 
 27. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.554 (West 2006) (requiring that no registrant shall reside within 
1,000 feet); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 570 (West 2003) (forbidding all registered sex offenders from 
residing within 2,000 feet of areas where children congregate).   
 28. One very famous example of a municipality enacting a residency restriction can be found in 
Miami-Dade County‘s Miami Beach Code of Ordinances § 70-402. The law enacted proved so 
restrictive that a group of sex offenders had no choice but to take up residence under a bridge. Intense 
public scrutiny pressured the local government into changing the law and moving the sex offenders in 
April 2010. For an account, see Rachel J. Rodriguez, Note, The Sex Offender Under the Bridge: Has 
Megan‟s Law Run Amok?, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 1023, 1038 (2010).  
 29. Tekle-Johnson, supra note 22, at 618–19. 
 30. Amanda Moghaddam, Comment, Popular Politics and Unintended Consequences: The 
Punitive Effect of Sex Offender Residency Statutes From an Empirical Perspective, 40 SW. U. L. REV. 
223, 229 (2010). 
 31. See Geraghty, supra note 15, at 514 (identifying the lack of evidence in favor of such 
restrictions and arguing that offenders with stable housing would be less likely to reoffend); Tekle-
Johnson, supra note 22, at 612–613 (noting the lack of evidence supporting residency restrictions, and 
suggesting they could make sex offenders more likely to offend by isolating them, removing them 
from therapeutic influences, and increasing psychosocial stressors that are associated with reoffense). 
 32. See, e.g., Joseph J. Fischel, Transcendent Homosexuals and Dangerous Sex Offenders: 
Sexual Harm and Freedom in the Judicial Imaginary, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL‘Y 277, 286 (2010) 
(providing overview of criticisms of sex offender residency restrictions, including that they do not 
reduce offenses and that they waste resources, encourage violent behavior, and excessively burden 
offenders).  
 33. Corey Rayburn Yung, The Emerging Criminal War on Sex Offenders, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 435, 473–74 (2010) (―For sex offenders, the loss of liberty is already being felt.‖). In this Article, 
Rayburn describes the hardships that residency restrictions can impose, including physical separation 
from family and friends, being forced to move, and not being allowed to travel through particular 
areas. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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offenders‘ interactions with children even when such offenders have not 
targeted children previously and there has been no finding that these 
offenders are likely to reoffend.
34
 Residency restrictions appear to assume 
that most sex offenders are violent pedophiles that target strangers, even 
when reality differs.
35
  
Given these criticisms, it is not surprising that residency restrictions 
have been repeatedly challenged in courts—though they have not yet 
reached the Supreme Court.
36
 Defendants consistently challenge these 
restrictions by claiming that their imposition constitutes a taking,
37
 
infringes upon an individual‘s right to substantive due process,38 and 
offends the Eighth Amendment
39
 and the Ex Post Facto Clause.
40
 The 
variety of these challenges is not surprising given that residency 
restrictions are relatively new and do not clearly fit within any one 
 
 
 34. See, e.g., Tekle-Johnson, supra note 22, at 615–16. 
 35. Shelley Ross Saxer, Banishment of Sex Offenders: Liberty, Protectionism, Justice, and 
Alternatives, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1397, 1403 (2009) (noting that more than 90 percent of sex crimes 
against children are perpetrated by trusted figures or acquaintances rather than strangers).  
 36. Chiraag Bains, Next-Generation Sex Offender Statutes: Constitutional Challenges to 
Residency, Work, and Loitering Restrictions, 42 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 483, 485 (2007).  
 37. A takings challenge essentially argues that the restrictions imposed by the law are so severe 
that the offender has been deprived of his or her property in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the 
Constitution. There has been one notable success in takings challenges. See Mann v. Dep‘t of Corr., 
653 S.E.2d 740 (Ga. 2007). The principle is limited even in Georgia, though. The Georgia Supreme 
Court had previously rejected Mann‘s takings challenge when an earlier law forced him to move from 
his mother‘s home. Mann v. State, 603 S.E.2d 283, 285 (Ga. 2004). Some laws foreclose a takings 
challenge by grandfathering in residences owned before a place where children congregate was 
established. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 947.1405 (Supp. 2011). For a more detailed exploration of takings 
and residency restrictions, see Elissa Zlatkovich, Note, The Constitutionality of Sex Offender 
Residency Restrictions: A Takings Analysis, 29 REV. LITIG. 219 (2009).  
 38. In a substantive due process challenge, the reviewing court must determine whether a 
fundamental right is implicated. If the right is fundamental, the court applies strict scrutiny. If it is not, 
the court applies rational basis review. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997). 
Courts that have entertained substantive due process challenges have not identified any fundamental 
rights implicated by residency restrictions, and have upheld them under rational basis review. See Doe 
v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 710–716 (8th Cir. 2005) (describing number of asserted rights—including 
right to live where one wants, right to intrastate travel, and right to family—while holding that they 
either are not implicated by an Iowa statute or are not fundamental); see also Weems v. Little Rock 
Police Dept., 453 F.3d 1010, 1015 (8th Cir. 2006) (same with respect to Arkansas statute).  
 39. The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. It 
was initially interpreted to apply solely against the federal government. See, e.g., Barron v. Baltimore, 
32 U.S. 243, 250 (1833). The Eighth Amendment was incorporated against the states via the 
Fourteenth Amendment in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). For simplicity‘s sake, this 
Note refers to the Eighth Amendment when discussing challenges brought under cruel and unusual 
punishment. 
 40. The Constitution bars both states and the federal government from enacting ex post facto 
laws. U.S. CONST. Art. I, §§ 9, 10. Ex post facto and Eighth Amendment challenges have been rejected 
because residency restrictions have not been held to be punishments subject to the Eighth Amendment. 
See Miller, 405 F.3d at 723 n.6. The Supreme Court has not addressed this matter, but did conclude 
that registration requirements were nonpunitive in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105–06 (2003).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss2/4
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provision of the Constitution.
41
 Though punitive in effect, they do not 
easily fit within the judicial definition of punishment.
42
 Thus, courts must 
attempt to delineate where the laws fit into a given constitutional 
scheme.
43
  
Even with such challenges, residency restrictions have largely been 
upheld.
44
 Indeed, many states and municipalities have passed, or have 
attempted to pass, increasingly restrictive statutes in recent years.
45
 The 
public hatred towards sex offenders makes statutes like these especially 
popular.
46
  
While the arguments against residency restrictions are compelling, this 
Note does not call for their abolition. As the Doe situation illustrates,
47
 
there are offenders who should be kept away from children. Instead, this 
Note argues that the real problem with current residency restrictions is that 
they are applied too broadly, and against numerous offenders who do not 
deserve to be so restricted.
48
 In lieu of barring them all together, courts 
should rein in the scope of who can be constitutionally restricted, thereby 
preventing comparatively innocent conduct from being grouped with 
sexually dangerous behavior. This Note urges achievement of this 
objective through the categorical approach to the Eighth Amendment.  
The categorical approach to the Eighth Amendment can be adopted in 
this context through two relatively minor shifts in current doctrine.
49
 One 
 
 
 41. See infra Part IV. 
 42. See infra Part IV. 
 43. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) (―[Constitutional] legislation . . . 
should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works 
changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. . . . This is peculiarly true of constitutions. 
They are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions.‖). 
 44. Saxer, supra note 35, at 1399 n.6 (describing challenges to residency restrictions and noting 
that the majority have been unsuccessful). 
 45. Georgia, for example, attempted to enact one of the most restrictive sex offender residency 
restrictions in the country in 2006. The law prohibited registered sex offenders from residing or 
loitering in a location within 1,000 feet of a child-care facility, church, school, or area where minors 
congregate, including bus stops. That law was struck down by the Georgia Supreme Court as an 
unconstitutional taking. Mann v. Ga. Dep‘t of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740, 745 (Ga. 2007).  
 46. Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Collectivism and Ex-Offender Residence Exclusion Laws, 
92 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6 (2006) (―Foremost among the targets for the nation‘s punitive zeal have been sex 
offenders.‖). 
 47. See supra notes 8–13. 
 48. See infra Part III.C. 
 49. These shifts certainly would have collateral consequences. See infra Part IV. That said, the 
consequences may be less significant than other solutions to the residency restriction problem. Courts 
have not struck down these laws under rational basis review. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 710 (8th 
Cir. 2010). To do so, one would likely have to recognize a fundamental right and apply strict scrutiny. 
See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (describing strict 
scrutiny as ―scrutiny that is strict in theory, but fatal in fact‖). Recognizing fundamental rights, 
however, takes the matter ―outside the arena of public debate and legislative action.‖ Washington v. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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is via an extension of a recent court decision, Graham v. Florida,
50
 to 
allow sex offenders to challenge residency restrictions categorically, rather 
than individually. The other is for courts to recognize residency 
restrictions as punishment. This Note proceeds in five parts. The first 
provides relevant background on the Eighth Amendment. The second 
explores the meaning of Graham v. Florida and how it relates to residency 
restrictions. The third evaluates residency restrictions under the Eighth 
Amendment. The fourth explores the meaning of punishment, whether it 
encompasses residency restrictions, and reasons to redefine it. Part V 
offers some concluding thoughts.  
I. EIGHTH AMENDMENT BACKGROUND 
In addition to banning barbarous punishments like torture,
51
 the Eighth 
Amendment requires proportionality between sentences and punishment.
52
 
A consistent definition of proportionality has proven elusive.
53
 The current 
doctrine consists of two separate types of proportionality analysis.
54
 The 
first type considers the circumstances surrounding a particular defendant 
and a particular sentence in order to determine if the sentence is grossly 
disproportionate.
55
 The second type allows classes of defendants to 
challenge a sentencing practice and results in ―categorical restrictions‖ on 
sentences under the Eighth Amendment.
56
 This part will outline the 
development of these approaches.  
 
 
Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). The Court has urged extreme caution with recognizing 
fundamental rights. Id. If a court recognized a new fundamental right, it would impact not only 
residency restrictions, but any other law that arguably infringed upon it. The ultimate effect could be 
more dramatic than what is proposed in this Note.  
 50. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).  
 51. Id. at 2021 (―The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the imposition of 
inherently barbaric punishments under all circumstances.‖). 
 52. Id. (―The concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment.‖). 
 53. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1052 (2004) 
(noting that while the Court always acknowledges the concept of proportionality in the abstract, it has 
applied it inconsistently).  
 54. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021 (―The Court‘s cases addressing the proportionality of 
sentences fall within two general classifications. The first involves challenges to the length of term-of-
years sentences given all the circumstances in a particular case. The second comprises cases in which 
the Court implements the proportionality standard by certain categorical restrictions on the death 
penalty.‖); see also Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional 
Sentencing Law and the Case, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145 (2009).  
 55. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021. 
 56. Id. at 2022 (noting that this was previously only applied to death penalty cases).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss2/4
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A. Defining Proportionality 
The Supreme Court first expressly acknowledged that punishments 
must be keyed to offenses in Weems v. United States.
57
 Paul Weems, a 
public official in the Philippines, was convicted of falsifying a public 
document and sentenced to a fine and fifteen years of cadena temporal, a 
form of imprisonment that involves hard labor.
58
 The Court began its 
analysis by acknowledging that the full scope of ―cruel and unusual‖ had 
not been clearly defined.
59
 It proceeded to describe a series of decisions, 
with some suggesting the requirement of proportionality and others 
disavowing it.
60
 Ultimately, the Court expressed its belief that ―it is a 
precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and 
proportioned to offense.‖61 The Court then struck down Weems‘ sentence 
as disproportionate, and thus cruel and unusual.
62
 
A series of decisions after Weems laid down other basic principles of 
current Eighth Amendment analysis.
63
 Robinson v. California
64
 held that 
ninety days‘ imprisonment was cruel and unusual for the crime of 
addiction to narcotics.
65
 Cruelty, it held, should not be determined in the 
abstract.
66
 The Court illustrated the point by noting that a day in prison 
would be cruel and unusual if imposed for the crime of having a cold.
67
 
Trop v. Dulles
68
 discussed Weems and held that the meaning of the Eighth 
Amendment derives from ―the evolving standards of decency that mark 
the progress of a maturing society.‖69 Several cases thereafter have 
invoked this analysis while striking down application of the death penalty 
to certain lesser crimes.
70
  
 
 
 57. 217 U.S. 349, 363 (1910) (citing the Penal Code of Spain Arts. 105, 106). 
 58. Id. at 357–58. Persons punished by cadena ―shall always carry a chain at the ankle, hanging 
from the wrists; they shall be employed at hard and painful labor, and shall receive no assistance 
whatsoever from without the institution.‖ Id. at 364 (quoting Penal Code of Spain Arts. 105, 106). 
 59. Id. at 368 (―What constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment has not been exactly decided.‖).  
 60. Id. at 369–73. 
 61. Id. at 367.  
 62. Id. at 381. 
 63. That is to say, the Court still frequently refers to the principles these cases identify. Some are 
applied more frequently than others.  
 64. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).  
 65. Id. at 667.  
 66. Id.  
 67. Id.  
 68. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
 69. Id. at 101. 
 70. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding that death 
penalty is grossly disproportionate sentence for the rape of an adult); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Weems definitively established that sentences must be proportional, but 
it did not provide a clear test or factors that courts should consider in 
evaluating sentences.
71
 Eighth Amendment cases after Weems reaffirmed 
proportionality, but also did not outline clear guideposts for reviewing 
courts. Finally, in Solem v. Helm, which was decided seventy-three years 
after Weems, the Court began to articulate the standards that inform 
current proportionality analysis.
72
  
Jerry Helm was a career criminal who committed his seventh 
nonviolent felony by writing a bad check.
73
 He was sentenced to life in 
prison under a recidivist statute.
74
 The Court first rejected the State‘s 
contention that proportionality was not applicable to a felony prison 
sentence.
75
 Finding that federalism and the need for individual sentencing 
create a wide range of constitutional sentences, the Court found that some 
are so disproportionate that they violate the Eighth Amendment.
76
 
Objective factors, the Court ruled, should guide the proportionality 
determination.
77
 The Court identified factors used in previous 
proportionality cases, both capital and noncapital.
78
 They included the 
gravity of the offense compared to the harshness of the sentence, the 
sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, and the 
sentence imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.
79
 Applying 
these factors, the Court ruled that Helm‘s sentence was significantly 
disproportionate to his crime and was therefore unconstitutional.
80
  
B. Two Tracks of Proportionality Analysis 
Prior to Solem v. Helm, the Court had not explicitly distinguished 
noncapital cases from capital sentences under the Eight Amendment.
81
 
 
 
(1982) (holding that death penalty is cruel and unusual for felony murder when defendant did not 
actually kill).  
 71. The Court in Weems weighed the offense and the sentence, but did not elaborate on any 
factors or considerations that lead to the conclusion. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 380–81.  
 72. 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
 73. Id. at 279–81. 
 74. Id. at 282. 
 75. Id. at 288–89. 
 76. Id. at 290 n.17. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. at 290.  
 79. Id. at 290–92.  
 80. Id. at 303. 
 81. The Court had acknowledged in Rummel v. Estelle that it was possible to argue that prison 
sentences were within the legislature‘s prerogative based on precedents. See 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980). 
Solem v. Helm dismissed this acknowledgement as merely recognition of the possibility, and not 
adoption of it. See Helm, 463 U.S. at 288.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss2/4
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After Helm, the Court began to distinguish between capital and noncapital 
sentences,
82
 but the analysis for both kinds of sentence was guided by the 
objective factors outlined above.
83
 However, the Court began to apply 
these objective factors differently in capital and noncapital sentences.
84
 
Two distinct approaches emerged.
85
 The first approach, called gross 
proportionality, derives from Helm but is a more limited form of review 
developed by Harmelin v. Kennedy.
86
 Under gross proportionality review, 
the Court considers a challenge to an individual‘s sentence given all the 
circumstances in the particular case.
87
 The second approach, embodying 
categorical challenges, provides rules that define the scope of sentencing 
under the Eighth Amendment, and previously was limited to use in cases 
involving capital sentences.
88
 As both are relevant to evaluation of 
residency restrictions, both merit further background. 
1. Gross Proportionality 
The current standard for gross proportionality analysis comes from 
Justice Kennedy‘s concurrence in Harmelin v. Michigan.89 The opinion 
begins by reiterating that the Eighth Amendment does contain ―a narrow 
proportionality principle,‖ but the exact contours are unclear.90 The 
opinion describes the difficulties in judging the prison terms imposed 
because they involve a ―substantive penological judgment‖ that is 
―properly within the province of the legislatures, not courts.‖91 As such, 
courts should grant substantial deference to legislatures.
92
 The opinion 
further states that legislatures can rely on any permissible penalogical 
theory, that federalism is valuable and limits review, and that objective 
 
 
 82. Helm, 463 U.S. at 289 (―As a result, ‗our decisions [in] capital cases are of limited assistance 
in deciding the constitutionality of the punishment‘ in a noncapital case.‖ (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. 
at 272)). 
 83. See Helm, 463 U.S. at 290 (holding that while successful proportionality challenges will be 
exceptionally rare in noncapital sentences, the proportionality analysis is still applicable to them).  
 84. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2047 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the 
Court ―cabined‖ the reasoning on Solem v. Helm at its next opportunity in support of federalism 
principles).  
 85. See id. at 2021.  
 86. See id. at 2047 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 87. See id. at 2021.  
 88. Id.  
 89. 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). The case was decided by a plurality. 
Kennedy‘s opinion is what ultimately shaped the law. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021 (referring to 
Kennedy‘s concurrence as the controlling opinion).  
 90. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 997–98.  
 91. Id. at 998 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275–76 (1980)). 
 92. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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factors should guide the analysis where possible.
93
 The sum of these 
observations is that the Eighth Amendment does not require strict 
proportionality, but forbids only grossly disproportionate sentences.
94
 The 
Court then modifies Helm by holding that only in the rare case where the 
initial comparison results in the ―inference of gross proportionality‖ 
should courts proceed to compare sentences within or between 
jurisdictions.
95
 
The gross proportionality standard that emerged after Harmelin was 
highly deferential to the state legislatures. Since then, the Court has upheld 
a life sentence under a ―three-strikes‖ law for stealing golf clubs in Ewing 
v. California,
96
 and another life sentence for a similar theft offense in 
Lockyer v. Andrade.
97
 These decisions prompted one commentator to 
observe that meaningful review in a gross proportionality case is 
essentially dead.
98
 Indeed, the Court has ruled no sentence of years grossly 
disproportionate since Solem v. Helm.
99
  
2. Categorical Challenges 
The second series of Eighth Amendment cases makes use of the 
categorical approach.
100
 In the categorical analysis, the Supreme Court 
adopts certain categories of lessened culpability, generally regarding the 
death penalty, to define the scope of sentencing under the Eighth 
Amendment.
101
 When adopting these categories, the Court first considers 
―‗objective indicia of society‘s standards, as expressed in legislative 
enactments and state practice‘ to determine if there is a national consensus 
against the sentencing practice at issue.‖102 The Court then applies its own 
independent judgment, taking into account ―the Eighth Amendment‘s text, 
history, meaning, and purpose.‖103 The Court has defined rules on two 
 
 
 93. Id. at 999–1001. 
 94. Id. at 1001. 
 95. Id. at 1005. 
 96. 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
 97. 538 U.S. 63 (2003). 
 98. Chemerinsky, supra note 53, at 1059 (―In 2003, in Ewing and Andrade, the Court greatly 
weakened, if not almost eliminated, proportionality review, as applied to prison sentences.‖). 
 99. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2047 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the 
Court had entertained just three such challenges and rejected all three as not grossly disproportionate).  
 100. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005)). 
 103. Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008)). 
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bases. One is the nature of the offense. The other revolves around 
characteristics of the defender.
104
  
Kennedy v. Louisiana,
105
 for example, invalidated a death sentence 
because of the nature of the offense, aggravated child rape.
106
 The Court 
acknowledged the anguish and severe impact that rape has, but concluded 
that the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.
107
 The Court explained 
that with respect to crimes against the individual, intentional first-degree 
homicide is categorically different from other crimes.
108
 In order to impose 
the death penalty, the Court required defendants have the highest level of 
culpability.
109
  
Another line of decisions defines the confines of the Eighth 
Amendment by establishing rules based on characteristics of defendants.
110
 
In Atkins v. Virginia,
111
 the Court ruled that executing the mentally 
retarded is cruel and unusual.
112
 Because such individuals intellectually 
function in a lower range, the Court ruled that they could not act with the 
appropriate level of moral culpability associated with the most serious 
adult criminal conduct.
113
 This inability, in turn, meant that mentally 
retarded individuals could not be among the most deserving of execution, 
and thus the death penalty was inappropriate.
114
  
Soon after, in Roper v. Simmons,
115
 the Court ruled that the Eighth 
Amendment bars death sentences for those who were juveniles at the time 
they committed the crime.
116
 In so doing, the Court again seemed to 
separate the death penalty from other sentences, noting that the Eighth 
Amendment applies to death with special force.
117
 After identifying a 
national consensus against the practice, the Court examined the differences 
between juveniles and adults.
118
 Juveniles, they opined, lack maturity and 
 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. 554 U.S. 407 (2008). 
 106. Id. at 413. 
 107. Id. at 435. 
 108. The Court had previously struck down death sentences for the rape of an adult woman in 
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), and for felony murder in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 
(1982).  
 109. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 538.  
 110. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010).  
 111. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 112. Id. at 321. 
 113. Id. at 306, 321. 
 114. Id. at 319.  
 115. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  
 116. Id. at 573–74. 
 117. Id. at 568 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 856 (1988) (O‘Connor, J., 
concurring)).  
 118. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70. 
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have an undeveloped sense of responsibility, are more vulnerable to 
negative influences and outside pressures, and feature less defined 
personality traits.
119
 These characteristics mean that juveniles‘ 
―irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an 
adult.‖120 Therefore, justifications for the death penalty apply with less 
force.
121
 While admitting it was not perfect, the Court argued that the 
reasons for drawing the line at which the death penalty could be applied at 
eighteen were not arbitrary.
122
 
After Roper, Atkins, and Kennedy, the Eighth Amendment confines the 
scope of the death penalty to homicide crimes and to those over eighteen 
who function within a normal level.
123
 The then-oft-repeated explanation 
for the categorical approach is that the death penalty is to be confined to a 
narrow category of the most morally responsible criminals, and some 
groups simply cannot qualify among the most morally reprehensible.
124
  
It is understandable, then, that most commentators assumed there were 
two tracks for Eighth Amendment analysis: one for capital cases and one 
for noncapital cases.
125
 Capital sentences were to be subjected to a 
searching review; noncapital sentences were not.
126
 If that assumption 
were true, residency restrictions could be challenged as grossly 
disproportionate, but would not be subject to categorical challenges.
127
 The 
2010 case Graham v. Florida, however, challenges this assumption.
128
 
C. Graham v. Florida 
Graham v. Florida
129
 involved a challenge to a life sentence without 
the possibility of parole by a juvenile offender.
130
 Terrance Jamar Graham 
 
 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. at 553 (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835).  
 121. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.  
 122. Id. at 574.  
 123. The goal of the Court‘s narrowing in the death penalty arena is to ensure that only the most 
deserving of execution are put to death. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002); Roper, 543 
U.S. at 568 (holding that capital punishment must be limited to only the most deserving who have 
―extreme culpability‖). 
 124. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568.  
 125. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 54, at 1146 (―In capital cases . . . the Court will scrutinize 
whether the death sentence is proportionate to the crime and the defendant. . . . In noncapital cases, in 
contrast, the Court has done virtually nothing to ensure that the sentence is appropriate.‖)  
 126. Id.  
 127. Though the two tracks are often described as term-of-years sentences or capital cases, the real 
distinction seems to be between capital sentences and everything else.  
 128. See infra Part II. 
 129. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
 130. Id. at 2017–18. 
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was arrested for robbery at sixteen and charged as an adult.
131
 He agreed to 
a plea bargain and was sentenced to three years‘ probation.132 Graham then 
committed another robbery before he turned eighteen and was charged 
with the new crime and a probation violation.
133
 He was sentenced to life 
in prison, and because Florida had abolished parole, it was without the 
possibility of release.
134
  
The Court first described both the gross proportionality approach and 
the categorical approach, which it acknowledged previously had been 
applied only in the capital context.
135
 Graham challenged his sentence on a 
categorical basis, though, rather than under gross proportionality.
136
 The 
Court agreed and analyzed his sentence under this approach.
137
 Gross 
proportionality was not appropriate in evaluating Graham‘s sentence 
because it was the entire life without parole sentence as applied to 
juveniles that was in question.
138
 The practice, rather than the particular 
details of Graham‘s case, was challenged. The Court held that where 
―[the] case implicates a particular type of sentence as it applies to an entire 
class of offenders who have committed a range of crimes,‖ the appropriate 
standard is the categorical approach.
139
 Under this standard, the Court 
ruled that life sentences for juveniles without the possibility of parole 
violated the Eighth Amendment.
140
  
II. THE MEANING OF GRAHAM: WHAT IS DIFFERENT? 
The decision in Graham answers the potentially narrow question of 
―whether the Constitution permits a juvenile offender to be sentenced to 
life in prison without parole for a non-homicide crime.‖141 But, the case 
implies a great deal more. Graham v. Florida may ultimately prove more 
significant for changing the underlying rationale behind the Court‘s 
approach to the Eighth Amendment. The Court had long held that the 
death penalty was different, ―not in degree but in kind.‖142 Previous 
 
 
 131. Id. at 2018. 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. at 2018–19. 
 134. Id. at 2020. 
 135. Id. at 2021–24. 
 136. Id. at 2022–23. 
 137. Id.  
 138. Id.  
 139. Id.  
 140. Id. at 2034.  
 141. Id. at 2017–18.  
 142. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289 (1983) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 
(1976) (Stewart, J., concurring)).  
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decisions that confined the application of the death penalty could all be 
justified by claiming the Eighth Amendment required that death be 
reserved for the highly culpable, those most deserving of death.
143
 After 
Graham, this distinction cannot justify the different approach the Court 
takes when applying categorical rules.
144
 Some commentators have already 
suggested interpretations.
145
 This part addresses three possible 
understandings and their applications.  
A. Juveniles are Different 
One interpretation of Graham v. Florida is that not only is death 
different, but juveniles are different as well.
146
 Under this interpretation, 
sentences that meet the requirements outlined in the majority opinion will 
be evaluated categorically if they involve a sentencing practice relating to 
either the death penalty or juveniles.
147
 An adult that is sentenced to life 
without parole would not be evaluated under the categorical standard, but 
instead under gross proportionality.
148
 The Court does cite a number of 
studies regarding the culpability of juveniles in the opinion, which would 
not be relevant if the Court intended to expand categorical challenges 
broadly.
149
  
Categorical challenges have been applied in nonjuvenile contexts 
previously, though.
150
 Thus, there does not seem to be any reason to 
evaluate only death penalty cases and juvenile cases in one way and not 
 
 
 143. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2046 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 144. Id. at 2046 (―‗Death is different‘ no longer. The Court now claims not only the power 
categorically to reserve ‗the most severe punishment‘ for those that the Court thinks are ‗the most 
deserving of execution,‘ but also to declare that ‗less culpable‘ persons are categorically exempt from 
the ‗second most severe penalty.‘‖) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).  
 145. For early impressions, see Redefining Cruel Punishment for Juveniles, N.Y. TIMES ROOM 
FOR DEBATE BLOG (May 17, 2010, 6:27 P.M.), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/17/ 
redefining-cruel-punishment-for-juveniles/?scp=3&sq=graham%20v.%20florida&st=cse. 
 146. Stephen St. Vincent, Commentary, Kids Are Different, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 9, 12 (2010) (―Another approach is that death is still different in the traditional sense, but 
that the Court now recognizes that kids are different as well. The Court could try to maintain separate 
jurisprudences for adult and juvenile sentencing.‖). 
 147. Id. (―In fact, Justice Kennedy seemed to be fighting against the idea that the approach in 
Graham should be extended to adult offenders. . . . The fact that the Court did not [invalidate all life 
without parole sentences] suggests that the Court intends to treat juvenile sentencing differently from 
adult sentencing.‖). 
 148. See United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009 (8th Cir. 2010) (rejecting extension of Graham that 
would prohibit life sentences without parole for a defendant whose sentence was increased because of 
previous juvenile offense, but whose current offense was committed as an adult).  
 149. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (―No recent data provide reason to 
reconsider the Court‘s observations in Roper about the nature of juveniles.‖). 
 150. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).  
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others.
151
 Presumably, if one does not have the requisite level of 
culpability, the punishment should be unconstitutional regardless of why 
that culpability is not present. 
B. Life without Parole is Different Enough 
A second interpretation of Graham v. Florida is that life without parole 
is less different than death but is more different than any other prison 
sentence.
152
 After all, life without parole does ultimately result in the end 
of a person‘s life.153 Life without parole represents a judgment, which is 
not subsequently reviewed, that a person is irredeemable.
154
 This 
determination arguably is entitled to greater protections than the gross 
proportionality afforded other Eighth Amendment cases, but fewer than 
those provided in capital cases.
155
 This interpretation has not carried the 
day at the appellate level so far.
156
 If this is the understanding of Graham 
v. Florida that ultimately prevails, the Court extended the traditional 
capital analysis, but in a fairly limited way. For now, it would prevent sex 
offenders from using categorical challenges.
157
  
C. The Textual Approach 
A third approach is the interpretation of Graham v. Florida suggested 
by a literal reading of the Court‘s explanation for the categorial approach. 
The majority opinion explains that it chose categorical analysis over gross 
 
 
 151. While the previous justification of ―death is different‖ had support, the majority opinion in 
Graham does not offer any justification for when categorical challenges should be applied other than 
the one stated. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023.  
 152. William W. Berry III, More Different Than Life, Less Different Than Death: The Argument 
for According Life Without Parole Its Own Category of Heightened Review Under the Eighth 
Amendment After Graham v. Florida, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1109, 1112 (2010) (―[This Article] argues that 
Graham does not eviscerate the death-is-different distinction but instead offers a new category of 
Eighth Amendment review: life without parole. In other words, the bifurcated death-is-different 
approach is not being collapsed by Graham, but trifurcated.‖). 
 153. Id. (―A sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is in many ways no 
more than a death sentence without an execution date.‖). 
 154. Id.  
 155. Id. at 1113 (―Specifically, the Article argues that ‗life without parole‘ merits its own category 
of heightened review in the application of the Eighth Amendment, requiring perhaps fewer categorical 
limitations than the death penalty but certainly greater protections than the ‗narrow proportionality‘ 
limitations previously applied in non-capital cases.‖). 
 156. See, e.g., U.S. v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009 (8th Cir. 2010).  
 157. The Eighth Amendment depends on evolving standards of decency. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 
U.S. 86, 101 (1958). So even if this or another more limited holding is the ultimate result of Graham, 
the holding could be extended further as decencies evolve and more information about the 
effectiveness or ineffectiveness about residency restrictions becomes available.  
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proportionality because the case questioned a particular sentence as it 
applied to an entire class of defendants who committed a range of 
crimes.
158
 The opinion does not offer any restrictive language suggesting 
that sentences must be of a particular type or offenders must be juveniles 
in order to qualify for categorical challenges.
159
 Without the ―death is 
different‖ justification, little prevents the Court from expanding 
categorical challenges into other penalties that it feels are imposed on 
groups not sufficiently deserving.
160
  
Though this interpretation is potentially expansive, the case does offer 
some limitations and safeguards. Even taking Graham to its furthest 
logical extension, categorical challenges are still restricted to one 
sentencing practice that is applied to an entire class who have committed 
various crimes.
161
 Additionally, in order for a court to impose a categorical 
rule, a challenger would have to establish that not only is his or her own 
sentence disproportionate, but any instance of that sentence applied to 
members of his or her class would be as well.
162
 This rigorous requirement 
likely forecloses many categorical challenges and secures a continued 
need for gross proportionality analysis.  
It is this third interpretation of Graham that would apply to residency 
restrictions. This approach conforms to the opinion‘s text and would 
provide for a coherent doctrine.
163
 Beyond the text, though, there are 
policy reasons why the Court should extend Graham at least to sex 
offender residency laws as well. Namely, sex offenders are so hated, and 
politicians so eager to restrict them, that deference is inappropriate.  
D. Rationale for Extending the Third Approach to Sex Offender Residency 
Restrictions 
Courts often seem reluctant to extend categorical challenges and 
traditionally defer the state legislature‘s judgement in proportionality 
 
 
 158. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022–23 (2010).  
 159. Id.  
 160. Id. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (―No reliable limiting principle remains to prevent the 
Court from immunizing any class of defenders from the law‘s third, fourth, fifth, or fiftieth most 
severe penalties as well.‖). Though Thomas uses this argument to oppose the majority‘s decision, the 
slippery slope argument does support the notion that Graham could eventually be read broadly into 
new areas—for instance, sex offender residency restrictions.  
 161. Id. at 2022–23.  
 162. Id. at 2048 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thomas points this out as an objection to the majority‘s 
adoption of a categorical rule, arguing that the petitioner had failed to carry this burden.  
 163. Eighth Amendment analysis has been consistently incoherent. See Chemerinsky, supra note 
53. 
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cases.
164
 The main justifications for this deference and reluctance are the 
doctrines of federalism and judicial restraint.
165
 The Court believes 
sentencing decisions are better left to legislatures.
166
 Judicial intervention 
in this area could be inconsistent because of the difficulties in comparing 
sentences of term-of-years.
167
 Additionally, varying sentences in different 
jurisdictions have been acknowledged as beneficial.
168
  
These rationales, and the conclusion that categorical challenges should 
be curtailed, are weaker in the context of residency restrictions, though. 
Sex offenders are among the most hated criminals.
169
 Pedophiles inspire 
fear and reactionary legislation.
170
 While some of this legislation may be 
effective, there is little motivation for politicians to consider the 
constitutional rights of offenders when responding to an emotional and 
horrible attack.
171
 Residency restrictions represent one area where judicial 
intervention may be necessary in order to balance out the hysteria and 
―race to the harshest‖ that sex offenders motivate.172 Municipalities 
sometimes implement these laws only to keep up, and not because they 
independently support them.
173
 The ultimate results can be perverse.
174
 
Legislators either explicitly or implicitly attempt to banish sex 
 
 
 164. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 24 (2003) (identifying tradition of deference).  
 165. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (―[M]arked divergences both in underlying 
theories of sentencing and in the length of prescribed prison terms are the inevitable, often beneficial, 
result of the federal structure.‖). 
 166. Id. at 998 (―The efficacy of any sentencing system cannot be assessed absent agreement on 
the purposes and objectives of the penal system. And the responsibility for making these fundamental 
choices and implementing them lies with the legislature.‖). 
 167. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 294 (1983) (―It is clear that a 25-year sentence generally is 
more severe than a 15-year sentence, but in most cases it would be difficult to decide that the former 
violates the Eighth Amendment while the latter does not.‖) (citation omitted). 
 168. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999 (noting that different local attitudes could mean different 
sentences in different jurisdictions that are all rational).  
 169. See Geraghty, supra note 15, at 514 (―Sex offenders are arguably the most despised members 
of our society, and states and municipalities are in a race to the bottom to see who can most thoroughly 
ostracize and condemn them.‖). 
 170. See Catherine L. Carpenter, Legislative Epidemics, A Cautionary Tale of Criminal Laws that 
Have Swept the Country, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 18 (2010) (describing tragic murders and the ―epidemic‖ 
of legislation designed to protect children that followed). 
 171. See Logan, supra note 46, at 19–20 (―In voicing their support for such laws, state and local 
politicians are refreshingly unabashed in identifying their ultimate desire: to purge their domains of ex-
offenders. They feel free to speak with such candor, confident in the widespread public appeal of their 
positions, despite the dubious practical effects of the laws.‖). 
 172. See Carpenter, supra note 170, at 53. Carpenter identifies several issues with sex offender 
legislation. States and local governments engage in a race to the bottom, passing increasingly strict 
laws. These laws push offenders out of one area and into another. Neighboring jurisdictions then pass 
stricter laws in order to keep up. Communities that resist risk a major influx of sex offenders. Id.  
 173. Id.  
 174. Id. at 55. 
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offenders.
175
 As a result, many do not register, and those that do may be 
more likely to recidivate.
176
 The judicial branch, by articulating rules, can 
confine legislatures and municipalities within acceptable ranges that 
protect both citizens and offenders.
177
  
While the decision in Graham v. Florida may ultimately be limited, 
there is no textual or logical reason to assume it will be. The justification 
put forth by the Court, along with the particular nature of sex-offender 
legislation, suggest that categorical challenges could be particularly useful 
in this area.  
III. EVALUATING RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS UNDER THE  
EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
Currently, residency restrictions are not evaluated under the Eighth 
Amendment because they are not considered punitive. Part IV of this Note 
addresses this barrier. Assuming this barrier is removed, this part 
addresses how challenges might proceed if residency restrictions were 
subjected to Eighth Amendment scrutiny. Residency restrictions are likely 
not torturous and barbarous in the traditional sense, so proportionality 
review is appropriate.
178
 The Court would apply either the gross 
proportionality standard or outline categorical rules regarding their 
permissiblility.
179
  
A. Gross Proportionality 
The gross proportionality standard is the default analysis, and 
previously has been applied in circumstances other than term-of-years 
sentences.
180
 While review of any sort could represent a moral victory, 
gross proportionality analysis is unlikely to find any residency restrictions 
 
 
 175. Id. (―Clearly, the public intends the isolation. It intends to force sex offenders to live 
anywhere but in their own communities.‖). 
 176. Id. at 55; see also Tekle-Johnson, supra note 22. 
 177. See infra Part III.C. 
 178. Residency restrictions can have fairly dramatic effects on offenders. Kevin Morales, one of 
the offenders who lived under the Julia Tuttle Causeway in Miami, described the experience as 
―mental torture.‖ See Gigi Stone, Sex Offenders Forced Under Miami Bridge, ABCNEWS.COM (May 
6, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/LegalCenter/Story?id=3096547. Nonetheless, the Court seems 
more focused on inherently barbaric punishments. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 
(2010).  
 179. See supra Part I.B. 
 180. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (reviewing denaturalization as a punishment 
under a proportionality standard).  
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unconstitutional.
181
 It is true that residency restrictions in some instances 
can be imposed for comparatively minor crimes.
182
 And the effects of 
residency restrictions can be quite severe.
183
 They are undoubtedly less 
severe, though, than the prison sentence upheld in Ewing.
184
 In fact, under 
this review, the Court has not struck down any prison sentence since 
Solem v. Helm.
185
 The rare opinion that does consider residency 
restrictions under gross proportionality has found them constitutional.
186
 
There is no reason to suspect that courts will revive this analysis into 
anything meaningful, despite the urging of scholars.
187
  
B. The Categorical Approach 
Applying the categorical approach to residency restrictions, on the 
other hand, could significantly reshape the inquiry. The reasons the Court 
articulated for accepting Graham‘s use of the categorical challenge 
support applying it to residency restrictions as well. If accepted as a 
punitive sentencing practice,
188
 sex residency restrictions are applied to a 
broad group of offenders who have committed a range of offenses.
189
 
Many such restrictions do not divide defenders by offense or by personal 
 
 
 181. The court in Doe v. Miller expressed its belief that residency restrictions are not grossly 
disproportionate, albeit without explanation. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 723 n.6 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(―Even assuming § 692A.2A were punitive, we would agree with the district court that the law is 
neither barbaric nor grossly disproportionate to the offenses committed by the Does.‖). 
 182. Phillip Alpert‘s case provides one example. Other examples of relatively innocent behavior 
that can lead to registration and thus residency restrictions can be found in Brennon Slattery, So-Called 
„Sexting‟ Laws Too Muddy, ABCNEWS.COM (Mar. 13, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/ 
PCWorld/story?id=7072039. 
 183. See Caleb Durling, Comment, Never Going Home: Does it Make us Safer? Does it Make 
Sense? Sex Offenders, Residency Restrictions, and Reforming Risk-Management Law, 97 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 317, 318–19 (2006) (describing Patrick Leroy, a sex offender who after his offense 
lived with his mother for more than a decade without reoffending, and was subsequently forced to 
move after Illinois passed a new residency restriction). 
 184. Even the most restrictive residency restrictions do not restrict movement as severely as 
prison. Residency restrictions can be as effective, though, in keeping a sex offender from communities, 
family, and friends. See supra note 33.  
 185. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2047 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 186. Miller, 405 F.3d at 723 n.6 (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge because residency 
restrictions are not punitive, but noting that even if they were, they would not be grossly 
disproportionate). 
 187. See, e.g., Donna H. Lee, Resuscitating Proportionality in Noncapital Criminal Sentencing, 
40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 527 (2008).  
 188. See infra Part IV. 
 189. Oklahoma‘s statute, for example, includes people who were convicted of indecent exposure 
and downloading child pornography, as well as for child exploitation and child rape. OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 57, § 582, 590 (West 2003).  
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characteristics.
190
 The likelihood of recidivism among sex offenders, 
however, is very dependent on characteristics of the offender and of the 
crime.
191
 As a result, categorical challenges would allow the Court to limit 
the scope of residency restrictions to those that are most deserving or 
likely to reoffend without prohibiting them all together.
192
 By determining 
whether a particular class has the requisite level of culpability to be 
punished in the manner the state wishes, the Court could protect those 
least likely to be protected by the democratic branches.
193
 
C. Application of Graham 
When applying the categorical approach, the Court first attempts to 
determine whether there is a national consensus against the sentencing 
practice.
194
 National consensus is established by looking at state 
legislation.
195
 The Court then determines in its ―own independent 
judgment‖ if the punishment violates the Eighth Amendment.196  
Several classes of offenders could attempt to challenge residency 
restrictions. One obvious category after Graham would be juveniles.
197
 As 
Roper noted, juveniles are categorically less morally culpable than 
adults.
198
 They may lack the requisite moral culpability to be banished 
from large areas indefinitely.
199
 Other potential classes could challenge as 
well. Offenders whose crimes did not involve children, for example, could 
challenge restrictions that ban them from areas where children congregate. 
Other possibilities include those who did not commit violent offenses or 
are unlikely to reoffend.
200
  
Determining national consensus regarding residency restrictions poses 
challenges. Previous cases have noted the importance of state legislatures 
 
 
 190. See supra notes 24–28. 
 191. U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT SEX 
OFFENDERS (2000), http://www.csom.org/pubs/mythsfacts.html. Among the listed myths is that sex 
offenders are likely to reoffend. Overall recidivism rates are lower than the general criminal 
population. Studies have found that one group of offenders, pedophiles, is more likely to reoffend and 
is resistant to treatment. See Tekle-Johnson, supra note 22, at 616.  
 192. See supra Part I.B.  
 193. See supra Part II.C. 
 194. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010) 
 195. Id.  
 196. Id.  
 197. Juveniles may now be different. See supra Part II.B. 
 198. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567 (2005).  
 199. For example, Oklahoma‘s statute does not have any built-in term, and seems to be an 
indefinite requirement. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 590 (West 2003). Under § 590.2, minors who 
commit a statutory rape may petition for removal, but courts are not compelled to grant the request.  
 200. See supra note 191 for statistics on reoffenders.  
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as the guidepost.
201
 Residency restrictions, however, can also be enacted 
by local governments.
202
 Though looking at both could provide a larger 
sample of national thought, the Court may wish to continue looking only 
to the states. As pointed out earlier, municipalities may enact laws in 
response to other cities‘ restrictions—to prevent becoming a safe haven for 
sex offenders—rather than because of a national consensus in favor of the 
policy.
203
 States may at times have similar motives, but they are less likely 
to be able to banish sex offenders to the next state over.
204
  
The trend does point toward additional restrictions, rather than 
repeals.
205
 More than half the states now have residency restrictions.
206
 
Some states, though, only apply such restrictions to offenders with a 
specific risk level or who committed particular crimes.
207
 People who 
committed lesser offenses could plausibly argue there is at least no 
national consensus in favor of regulating them.  
The Court grants consensus great weight, but such consensus is not 
conclusive.
208
 The second step of the inquiry is application of independent 
judicial judgment.
209
 The Court looks to the culpability of the defendant 
along with the severity of the sentence.
210
 Here, the diminished culpability 
of juveniles may warrant a categorical rule against the imposition of 
residency restrictions for juveniles. Offenders who did not commit violent 
crimes also may be less culpable, perhaps below the level of culpability 
necessary to support residency restrictions.  
 
 
 201. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010). 
 202. Suffolk County, for example, has generated controversy with its restrictive statute. See Corey 
Kilgannon, Suffolk County to Keep Sex Offenders on the Move, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2007, at B3, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/17/nyregion/17sex.html. 
 203. The ―not in my backyard‖ mentality of residency restrictions is problematic. See Corey 
Rayburn Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws: Residency Restrictions on Sex Offenders, 85 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 101, 104 (2007) (―Further, when one jurisdiction restricts the residency of its sex offenders 
by creating exclusion zones, neighboring communities are pressured to follow suit to avoid becoming 
a haven for local sex offenders.‖).  
 204. See infra note 270 and accompanying text.  
 205. Paula Reed Ward, Residency Restrictions for Sex Offenders Popular, but Ineffective, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 26, 2008, at B1, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/ 
08300/922948-85.stm (―Despite research that shows sex offender residency requirements actually 
hamper the rehabilitation of offenders, jurisdictions across the country continue to pass them, 
including Allegheny County last year.‖). 
 206. Yung, supra note 33, at 448 (finding residency restrictions in thirty states).  
 207. A 2006 study by the Connecticut government found that eight out of twenty-two residency 
restrictions limited their application to those adjudged violent or required a group to decide whether or 
not to impose the restrictions. See Sandra Norman-Eady, Chief Atty., Sex Offenders Residency 
Restrictions, CT GEN. ASSEMB. (May 23, 2007), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2007/rpt/2007-R-0380.htm. 
 208. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 434 (2008). 
 209. Id.  
 210. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010).  
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The Court also looks at whether the punishment serves ―legitimate 
penological goals.‖211 The purpose or effect may be any one of the goals 
of punishment: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation.
212
 
The results of this analysis are somewhat difficult to predict because 
residency restrictions are arguably nonpunitive.
213
 As such, the motivating 
factor is most often phrased in terms of the safety of children, rather than 
any particular penological goal.
214
 Regardless of how it is framed, though, 
it may be difficult for any of the goals to fully support current residency 
restrictions.  
Retribution requires that a sentence be ―directly related to the personal 
culpability of the criminal offender.‖215 Residency restrictions often do not 
make any determination regarding culpability, though, and apply across a 
broad group of offenders who have committed different underlying 
offenses.
216
 In reality, the laws are imposed with the stranger sex predator 
in mind.
217
 The personal culpability of these comparably rare offenders 
may justify the restrictions imposed upon them. Of course, if the 
challenging class were juveniles, retribution would be even less likely to 
support the sentence.
218
 Similarly, if the justification were deterrence, it 
would also apply with less force to juveniles.
219
 Legislators have not 
expressed deterrence purposes when enacting these laws, though.
220
  
Incapacitation would likely be cited as a motivating factor behind 
residency restrictions.
221
 Recidivism is a risk with some sex offenders, and 
incapacitating them makes sense.
222
 Residency restrictions do not prevent 
sex offenses, though, and they may actually increase recidivism in some 
cases.
223
 The suggested classes for categorical challenges are not 
particularly likely to reoffend anyway, so imposing severe restrictions to 
 
 
 211. Id. at 2028. 
 212. Id. at 2028 (citing Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003)).  
 213. See infra Part IV. 
 214. Moghaddam, supra note 30, at 229. 
 215. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028 (citing Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987)). 
 216. See supra notes 24–27 
 217. Yung, supra note 33, at 453 (―In particular, some myths such as stranger danger, unusually 
high post-release recidivism, sex offender homogeneity . . . have served as cornerstones to America‘s 
sex offender policy. Together, the myths support political efforts to vilify and restrict the liberties of 
sex offenders even when such policies are ultimately counterproductive.‖). 
 218. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005).  
 219. Id. (noting that juveniles, because of the same characteristics that make them less culpable, 
are less influenced by attempts to deter). 
 220. See infra note 270. 
 221. It is, at least, the goal that most closely correlates with protecting children. 
 222. See Tekle-Johnson, supra note 22, at 616 (pedophiles are likely to reoffend and resist 
treatment). 
 223. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.  
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incapacitate them does not make sense.
224
 Rehabilitation, likewise, is 
unlikely to support residency restrictions. Residency restrictions are more 
likely to prevent offenders who need treatment from effectively obtaining 
it.
225
 
In sum, residency restrictions on severe sex offenders may be justified 
by retributive purposes. For nonviolent offenders, juveniles, or others who 
are unlikely to recidivate, the justifications are strained at best. Between 
this and other reasons to doubt the culpability of many classes of 
offenders, the Court‘s independent judgment likely would lean toward 
implementing rules that excluded some offenders from restriction. In the 
absence of a clear national consensus, that may be sufficient to 
categorically protect certain classes of sex offenders from the irrational 
hatred of their communities.  
IV. THE MEANING OF PUNISHMENT: A POTENTIAL BARRIER 
The last part showed how an approach previously reserved for the 
death penalty could be used to ensure residency restrictions are only 
applied to those with the requisite level of culpability. This part identifies 
a barrier to this use of the Eighth Amendment. While the Supreme Court 
has not addressed it, residency restrictions may not comprise 
punishments—rendering them outside the scope of the Eighth 
Amendment. This part will briefly address the meaning of punishment and 
where residency restrictions fit in, provide additional reasons why 
residency restrictions should be considered punitive, and touch on 
collateral concerns.  
A. Defining Punishment 
The text of the Eighth Amendment limits its application to 
―punishments.‖226 What constitutes a punishment has been characterized 
variously by scholars as ―vexing‖227 and ―conceptually muddled.‖228 The 
definition of punishment is a potential barrier to the suggested approach to 
 
 
 224. See supra note 191. 
 225. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.  
 226. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (―Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.‖).  
 227. Pamela A. Wilkins, The Mark of Cain: Disenfranchised Felons and the Constitutional No 
Man‟s Land, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 85, 117 (2005). 
 228. Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil 
Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 781 (1997). 
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residency restrictions. Residency restrictions could be characterized as 
nonpunitive.
229
 On the other hand, if residency restrictions are considered 
punishment, many of them would be invalid as ex post facto laws.
230
 A 
brief background on punishment is necessary.  
Punishment was initially defined in Trop v. Dulles.
231
 The Court held 
that whether a law was punitive depended not on how Congress classified 
it, but rather on the substance of the statute.
232
 If the statute imposed a 
disability for the purpose of punishment—for example, to reprimand an 
offender—then the statute was penal and thus punitive.233 If another 
legitimate government purpose motivated the statute, then the Court said it 
would not be punitive.
234
 Where there are mixed purposes, the stated intent 
of the legislature controls.
235
 The Court did not outline any particular test 
or factors to determine the purpose of a statute.
236
  
Relevant factors were outlined later in Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez.
237
 To determine the purpose of a statute, courts should consider 
seven listed factors, but the Court noted that no particular factor is 
dispositive and the list is not exhaustive.
238
 The Court held that absent 
conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to the penal nature of the 
statute, these factors must be considered in relation to the statute on its 
face.
239
 The burden in Mendoza-Martinez, then, is on Congress to 
conclusively establish a penal purpose if it does not wish for courts to 
consider the other relevant factors.
240
  
 
 
 229. The seminal federal case found residency restrictions to be nonpunitive. Several state cases 
disagree. See infra notes 257–63. 
 230. See supra Part IV.C. 
 231. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
 232. Id. at 95 (―Doubtless even a clear legislative classification of a statute as ‗non-penal‘ would 
not alter the fundamental nature of a plainly penal statute. . . . The inquiry must be directed to 
substance.‖). 
 233. Id. at 96. 
 234. Id.  
 235. Id.  
 236. See id. at 97 (determining purpose without reference to any other factors). 
 237. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).  
 238. The factors are: ―whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether 
it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of 
scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and 
deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose 
to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in 
relation to the alternative purpose assigned‖ Id. at 168–69 (citations omitted).  
 239. Id. at 169.  
 240. The opinion does not mention that courts should defer to Congress‘s interpretation.  
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United States v. Ward
241
 revisited the same test, but clarified that the 
test actually included an additional first step.
242
 As before, prior to 
applying the factors listed in Mendoza-Martinez, courts should determine 
whether Congress has indicated a preference for labeling the statute as 
punitive or not.
243
 If Congress indicates that it intends a statute to be 
nonpunitive, the Court uses the Mendoza-Martinez factors to determine 
whether it is so punitive in purpose or effect to negate that intention.
244
 
After Ward, though, it is clear that ―only the clearest proof could suffice‖ 
to make a statute punitive that was not so intended.
245
 The burden is now 
on a challenger to definitively demonstrate the punitive purpose or 
effect.
246
  
The Court hinted at some deviations from this definition in Austin v. 
United States.
247
 In determining whether a statute was punitive in the 
context of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, the 
Court did not apply the Mendoza-Martinez test.
248
 Instead, it sought to 
determine whether the statute could be explained as serving in part to 
punish.
249
 The Court explained that a statute that ―cannot fairly be said 
solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also 
serving either a retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we 
have come to understand the term.‖250 The Court did not require the 
clearest proof of a statute being so punitive in purpose or effect as to 
 
 
 241. 448 U.S. 242 (1980).  
 242. Id. at 248 (noting that the Court‘s inquiry has traditionally proceeded in two steps. It first 
must determine if Congress has expressed a preference for one label or the other. It then proceeds to 
determine if a statute, by the clearest proof, is ―so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that 
intention.‖). While the Court describes this approach as traditional, it does not require the clearest 
proof required Mendoza-Martinez to determine when a statute is punitive. See Mendoza-Martinez, 372 
U.S. at 169.  
 243. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248.  
 244. Id.  
 245. Id.  
 246. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105 (2003) (stating that the respondent cannot show by the 
clearest proof that the law is so punitive in effect to overcome the legislature). The Court explicitly 
characterizes it as challenger‘s burden. Id. 
 247. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).  
 248. The Court specifically rejects the argument that the Eighth Amendment can only apply when 
a civil proceeding is so punitive that it is criminal under Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez. Under Austin, 
then, it seems like the factors from Mendoza-Martinez are used to determine whether something is 
criminal, rather than whether it is punishment. See id. at 607. This understanding is clearly in conflict 
with the Court‘s previous announcement that the Eighth Amendment only applies to criminal 
punishments. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977) (opining that the Eighth Amendment 
is only meant to protect those that are convicted of a crime).  
 249. Austin, 509 U.S. at 610. 
 250. Id. at 610 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1993)). 
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negate the purpose of Congress, but instead held that any statute that 
serves in part to punish is punitive.
251
 
This approach was clearly foreclosed in sex offender cases in Smith v. 
Doe.
252
 There, the Court determined whether a sex offender registration 
requirement was punitive.
253
 The Court‘s opinion applied the Mendoza-
Martinez standard without mention of Austin v. United States.
254
 While 
Austin could have represented a new direction for punishment, it now 
appears to be more of an anomaly, or potentially limited to only the 
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
255
 The challengers in 
Smith v. Doe, the Court concluded, were not able to demonstrate by the 
clearest proof that the purpose or effect of registration requirements was 
punitive.
256
 
B. Are Residency Restrictions Punitive? 
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed residency restrictions, 
but appellate circuits have. In Doe v. Miller,
257
 the Eighth Circuit 
evaluated Iowa‘s residency restrictions under the Mendoza-Martinez 
test.
258
 The court held that the stated purpose was regulatory, not punitive, 
and that the challengers had not provided the clearest proof necessary to 
overcome that presumption.
259
  
While this holding could foreclose the Eighth Amendment approach 
this Note supports, other courts have not been so quick to reject the 
challenge.
260
 State courts applying an equivalent to the Mendoza-Martinez 
standard have found sufficient reason to find residency restrictions 
punitive.
261
 Many commentators have also called for residency restrictions 
 
 
 251. Austin, 509 U.S. at 610. 
 252. 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
 253. Id. at 92. 
 254. Id. at 97.  
 255. Austin v. United States is still good law, but its precedential value is unclear. United States v. 
Halper, which Austin quotes on the definition of punishment, was abrogated by Hudson v. United 
States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997).  
 256. Smith, 538 U.S. at 105. 
 257. 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 258. Id. at 719. 
 259. Id. at 722. 
 260. See State v. Pollard, 908 N.E.2d 1145, 1154 (Ind. 2009) (holding that clearest proof exists 
showing effect of Indiana residency restriction statute is punitive and ruling that it violates the Ex Post 
Facto Clause as a result); see also Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 447 (Ky. 2009) (holding 
similarly).  
 261. See supra note 260. Kentucky specifically identified Mendoza-Martinez as the source of its 
standard. Baker, 295 S.W.3d at 443.  
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to be classified as punishment.
262
 The Supreme Court may ultimately have 
to rule definitively on the issue.
263
 
If the Court so decides, the outcome could differ from Smith v. Doe.
264
 
A number of justices on the Smith court took issue with some potential 
flaws in the majority‘s logic. One major issue of contention would be 
whether residency restrictions are clearly intended to be civil as opposed 
to criminal.
265
 Justice Souter expressed his belief that the registration 
requirement was not clearly intended to be civil.
266
 He argued that the 
statute‘s use of a previous crime ―as a touchstone, probably sweeping in a 
significant number of people who pose no real threat to the community, 
serves to feed suspicion that something more than regulation of safety is 
going on.‖267 In his opinion, the severity of the burden imposed by 
registration was also reminiscent of a punishment.
268
 If the legislatures did 
not clearly intend the laws to be civil and regulatory, then the ―clearest 
proof‖ standard is not appropriate for establishing whether the statutes are 
punitive.
269
 The motivation behind many residency restrictions is similarly 
conflicted.
270
  
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, dissented in Smith v. Doe, 
citing her belief that the act was excessive in relation to its nonpunitive 
purpose.
271
 Justice Ginsburg acknowledged the purposes, but argued that 
the scope was excessive.
272
 The registration requirement did not call for 
any determination of dangerousness.
273
 Additionally, the act did not key 
the duration of the requirement to the defender‘s risk of reoffending.274 
 
 
 262. See Bret R. Hobson, Note, Banishing Acts: How Far May States Go to Keep Convicted Sex 
Offenders Away From Children?, 40 GA. L. REV. 961, 990–92 (2006) (applying the Mendoza-
Martinez test and arguing that residency restrictions should be characterized as punishments); Sarah E. 
Agudo, Comment, Irregular Passion: The Unconstitutional and Inefficacy of Sex Offender Residency 
Laws, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 307, 323–26 (2008) (arguing similarly).  
 263. It has declined to do so at least once. See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. 
denied, 546 U.S. 1034 (2005).  
 264. The factors apply differently to residency restrictions than to registration requirements. For 
sources that go through this analysis, see supra note 262. 
 265. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 106–07 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring). 
 266. Id. at 110. 
 267. Id. at 109. 
 268. Id.  
 269. Id. at 110. Souter voted to uphold the law because of the presumption of constitutionally that 
is normally given to a state‘s law. He did not feel the statute was clearly valid.  
 270. Comments made during the passage of the Georgia residency restriction law, for example, 
sound like at least some lawmakers intended retributive purposes. At the very least, they deliberately 
intended to banish sex offenders. See Geraghty, supra note 15, at 515–18.  
 271. Smith, 538 U.S. at 114 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 272. Id. at 116. 
 273. Id.  
 274. Id. at 116–17. 
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The same issues that Ginsburg identified in the registration requirement 
are present and more severe in residency restriction statutes. Many do not 
require a determination of dangerousness, nor any indication that the 
offender is likely to be a risk to children.
275
 Some impose residency 
restrictions for indefinite durations, regardless of the underlying crime.
276
 
Despite these objections, the Court could hold that residency 
restrictions are nonpunitive under the current test.
277
 Even so, strong 
arguments have been advanced that the current test should be reformed.
278
 
Justice Stevens, also dissenting in Smith v. Doe, expressed his 
dissatisfaction with the Martinez-Mendoza test: ―No matter how often the 
Court may repeat and manipulate multifactor tests . . . it will never 
persuade me that the registration and reporting obligations that are 
imposed on convicted sex offenders and on no one else as a result of their 
conviction are not part of their punishment.‖279 Stevens went on to express 
his belief that a sanction imposed on everyone who commits a certain 
criminal offense, but is not imposed on others, and severely impairs a 
person‘s liberty interests is punishment.280 Residency restrictions meet the 
first two requirements of Stevens‘ test, and there is compelling evidence of 
the third.
281
 Under this test, residency restrictions would almost certainly 
be punishment.  
Justices Ginsburg and Justice Souter in their dissents both argued that 
the intent of the legislature was not clear. Ginsburg said she would 
neutrally evaluate the act based on the seven factors and not place the 
burden on the challenger. Policy reasons also suggest that deference to 
legislatures‘ stated intents is inappropriate here. As Part II.C discussed, 
there is little political incentive for legislators to guard the constitutional 
rights of a group that their constituents wish to cast out.
282
 Many sex 
 
 
 275. See supra note 207. 
 276. Id.  
 277. For example, the Court held the registration requirement nonpunitive despite the arguments 
in Smith v. Doe. Residency restrictions are sufficiently different from registration requirements that the 
analysis could vary significantly, even if the Court came to the same result.  
 278. Scholars, in addition to the Justices, have made this argument. For one proposed test, see 
Wilkins, supra note 227, at 129–31.  
 279. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 113 (2003) (emphasis in original). 
 280. Id.  
 281. See supra note 33. 
 282. See Tekle-Johnson, supra note 22, at 638 (―Because this group is one of the least defensible 
populations, legislators understand that there is little political price to be paid for mandating 
increasingly severe constraints on these individuals and much to be gained from voters who desire 
tough restraints.‖); see also Joel. A. Sherwin, Comment, Are Bills of Attainder the New Currency? 
Challenging the Constitutionality of Sex Offender Regulations that Inflict Punishment Without the 
“Safeguard of a Judicial Trial”, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1301, 1320–24 (2010). 
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offender laws have been passed quickly in the wake of violent attacks 
amidst public outcry.
283
 Granting deference to a local government‘s stated 
intent allows it not only to severely curtail the liberty of their most hated 
citizens, but also to prevent most challenges to that curtailment.
284
 
Scholars have suggested other, lesser standards of proof that may be more 
appropriate in the residency restriction context.
285
  
If residency restrictions are definitively nonpunitive, then Eighth 
Amendment analysis is not possible.
286
 The results have been mixed in 
courts so far. Some recent state court decisions suggest residency 
restrictions may already fall under the definition of punishment. Scholars 
and dissenting judges likewise argue for rules or standards that would 
include residency restrictions. Whether or not the current definition 
encompasses residency restrictions, policy reasons again suggest the Court 
should reconsider its deference.  
C. A Brief Note on Ex Post Facto Laws 
One collateral effect of recognizing residency restrictions as punitive 
would be to bring them within the purview of the ex post facto challenge. 
Federal courts have rejected ex post facto challenges of residency 
restrictions so far because the statutes have been considered 
nonpunitive.
287
 As such, the prohibition on ex post facto laws does not 
apply to them. If the prohibition did apply, residency restrictions are 
 
 
 283. See Fischel, supra note 32, at 283 (describing the ―moral panic‖ surrounding sex offenders 
and comparing it to previous sexual threats embodied by, among others, Jewish men, black men, and 
gay men); Hobson, supra note 262, at 962–63 (describing numerous tragic sex crimes and the statutes 
they inspired); see also Geraghty supra note 15, at 515 (explaining that impetus for Georgia‘s 2006 
residency restriction was a brutal child abduction by a repeat offender).  
 284. For a different view, see Christopher Moseng, Note, Iowa‟s Sex Offender Residency 
Restrictions: How the Judicial Definition of Punishment Leads Policy Makers Astray, 11 J. GENDER 
RACE & JUST. 125, 136–37 (2007) (arguing that deference courts grant the legislative label ultimately 
means that punishment means whatever lawmakers think it means, without a distinct separate 
definition).  
 285. See Tekle-Johnson, supra note 22, at 626 (arguing for a more lenient standard of proof, or 
that of ―substantial or reasonable proof,‖ in order to require courts to analyze more carefully the actual 
effects of potentially punitive laws). 
 286. Even if the Court declined to evaluate residency restrictions under the Eighth Amendment, 
principles from Graham or gross proportionality could inform its decision. See Sheldon Bernard Lyke, 
Lawrence as an Eighth Amendment Case: Sodomy and the Evolving Standards of Decency, 15 WM. & 
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 633 (2009) (arguing that while the Court claimed to be applying substantive 
due process analysis in Lawrence v. Texas, it was actually conducting Eighth Amendment analysis). 
 287. See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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almost certainly ex post facto laws.
288
 The state courts that have actually 
reached the substance of the challenge have found them to be 
impermissibly ex post facto.
289
 As a practical matter, this result may make 
courts leery of recognizing residency restrictions as punishment. Even if 
the current laws were considered ex post facto, it would not ban residency 
restrictions altogether. It would merely prevent them from being applied 
retroactively.
290
  
CONCLUSION 
Phillip Alpert will not be the last teen to make a sexting mistake,
291
 and 
John Doe will not be the last pedophile unable to reform his sexual 
urges.
292
 Society needs to adapt its laws and crime prevention strategies to 
fit both. Residency restrictions may ultimately be discredited, wholly 
struck down, or abandoned, but until that happens they must at the very 
least be confined to those deserving of such pervasive regulation.  
While there are other means of challenging these statutes, the practical 
reality of residency restrictions fit squarely within the type of sentencing 
practice that the majority opinion in Graham notes should be evaluated 
under the categorical approach to the Eighth Amendment. This type of 
challenge would be effective at confining the scope of residency 
restrictions in a way that ensures only those people with the requisite 
moral culpability are subjected to them. Juveniles, nonviolent offenders, 
those who are unlikely to recidivate, and those who did not direct their 
 
 
 288. The definitive case on ex post facto law is Calder v. Bull, decided over 200 years ago. The 
opinion identifies four types of laws that are ex post facto:  
1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, and which was 
innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd. Every law that aggravates a 
crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3rd. Every law that changes the 
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when 
committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or 
different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in 
order to convict the offender. 
3 U.S. 386, 390. Residency restrictions, if punitive, fall squarely within the third category.  
 289. See, e.g., State v. Pollard, 908 N.E.2d 1145, 1153 (Ind. 2009); Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 
S.W.3d 437, 447 (Ky. 2009). 
 290. For a more detailed discussion of ex post facto laws and residency restrictions, see Michelle 
Olson, Comment, Putting the Brakes on the Preventive State: Challenging Residency Restrictions on 
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crimes at children may all have reason to argue that they should not be 
regulated in this manner. Clarifying punishment and expanding Graham 
could be a solution to an area that is fraught with potential for abuse and 
overzealousness. 
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